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ABSTRACT 
  Diagnostic tests have become indispensable in the rapidly growing 
field known as “precision medicine.” Precision medicine tailors 
treatments to individual patients by using these diagnostic tests to 
identify how a patient may respond to different therapies. Diagnostics 
are expensive to develop but show promise in optimizing patient 
treatment and creating healthcare savings. Even as the medical 
community has heralded precision medicine as the way of the future, 
the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have handed down a dizzying 
array of decisions regarding attempts to patent diagnostics and 
precision medicine techniques. Subsequently, courts have struggled to 
apply the test for patent eligibility, leaving the interpretation of 
patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act in a state of 
chaos.  
  This chaos has created concerns that diagnostics may be 
unpatentable, providing minimal protection or incentive for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in their development. To rectify 
this confusion, legislators have proposed overhauling the longstanding 
Patent Act and rewriting the patent-eligibility statute altogether. This 
Note argues that these legislative attempts are misguided. Though some 
remedy for the current patent-eligibility test is required, that solution 
should come from the courts, not the legislature. Courts can use a 
dynamic and nuanced common law approach to create a standard that 
can adapt to the continuously evolving technologies and scientific 
advancements that seek patent protection. A legislative override, on the 
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other hand, could leave the patent statute in as much chaos as before. 
A judicial refinement of the patent-eligibility test would allow for the 
patenting of meritorious diagnostics, providing the necessary 
innovation incentives for their continued development. 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, parents with high-risk pregnancies had only two 
options for prenatal genetic testing: amniocentesis, in which a needle is 
used to remove amniotic fluid from around the fetus for testing, or 
chorionic villus sampling, which uses a sample taken through the cervix 
or abdominal wall.1 Both techniques are invasive and carry risks of 
miscarriage as well as other complications.2 In 2011, a company called 
Sequenom brought to market a new noninvasive prenatal test called 
MaterniT21.3 This test could accurately detect many of the same 
genetic disorders, like Down syndrome, without the invasive 
procedures or their attendant risks.4 The test has become immensely 
popular and has been called “a global transformation of prenatal 
care.”5 Sequenom owned a patent on this new prenatal testing method, 
but when they attempted to assert it against competitors with similar 
 
 1. Prenatal Genetic Screening Tests, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Oct. 
2020), https://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Prenatal-Genetic-Screening-Tests [https://perma.cc/
MD94-NSSP]; High-Risk Pregnancy: Know What To Expect, MAYO CLINIC (Feb. 8, 2020), https:/
/www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/high-risk-pregnancy/
art-20047012 [https://perma.cc/B5E4-MH7B]. 
 2. Amniocentesis, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-
procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914 [https://perma.cc/F6PF-T9TJ]; Chorionic Villus 
Sampling, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/chorionic-
villus-sampling/about/pac-20393533 [https://perma.cc/TVQ9-R2A4]. 
 3. Andrew Pollack, A Less Risky Down Syndrome Test Is Developed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/business/sequenom-test-for-down-syndrome-raises-
hopes-and-questions.html [https://perma.cc/F2VY-MB6D].  
 4. Id. The current version of the test uses a blood sample to screen for Down syndrome and 
other chromosomal abnormalities. MaterniT21 PLUS Test, INTEGRATED GENETICS, https://
www.integratedgenetics.com/patients/pregnancy/maternit21plus [https://perma.cc/8GRM-A8FZ].  
 5. Diana W. Bianchi & Rossa W.K. Chiu, Sequencing of Circulating Cell-Free DNA During 
Pregnancy, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 464, 464 (2018); see also Sarah Elizabeth Richards, A Safe 
Prenatal Genetic Test Is Gaining Popularity with Young Moms-To-Be and Their Doctors, WASH. 
POST. (Jan. 5, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/a-safe-
prenatal-genetic-test-is-gaining-popularity-with-young-moms-to-be-and-their-doctors/2019/01/
04/746516a2-f4f2-11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html [https://perma.cc/AHP3-FWR4] (“In 
2017, nearly 60 percent of OB/GYNs prescribed” noninvasive prenatal testing “to younger 
women – up from 35 percent the year before.”).  
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tests, the Federal Circuit invalidated it.6 The company had raised over 
$50 million to develop its revolutionary technology,7 but because the 
test focused on a “law of nature”8 in testing DNA, according to the 
court it was not eligible for patent protection.9 
The technique at issue in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, 
Inc.10 is an example of an innovation in the rapidly growing field of 
pharmaceutical research known as “precision medicine,” also called 
“personalized medicine.”11 Precision medicine involves “treatments 
that are tailored to specific characteristics of individuals, such as a 
person’s genetic makeup.”12 These treatments often first employ an in 
vitro diagnostic test, which analyzes a patient’s blood or tissue sample.13 
The analysis from the test helps predict how the patient will respond to 
a certain drug or evaluates their genetic susceptibility to a disease or 
condition.14 This assessment is then followed by an accordant 
adjustment in the patient’s treatment plan.15 In this context, the 
diagnostic is known as a “companion diagnostic,” as it accompanies a 
treatment.16 Doctors may also order diagnostics for pure assessment 
purposes, like with Sequenom’s MaterniT21.17 Overall, diagnostics and 
 
 6. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 7. See Denise Gellene, Sequenom Raises $51.6 Million as It Prepares To Restart Down 
Syndrome Test, XCONOMY (May 12, 2010), https://xconomy.com/san-diego/2010/05/12/
sequenom-raises-51-6-million-as-it-prepares-to-restart-down-syndrome-test [https://perma.cc/4A
BR-LHLY].  
 8. Sequenom, 788 F.3d at 1376–79. 
 9. See infra Part I.A. 
 10. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 11. See generally Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Kathryn A. Phillips, Precision Medicine: From 
Science to Value, 37 HEALTH AFFS. 694 (2018) (detailing the current state of precision medicine 
and global areas of development). 
 12. Precision Medicine, FDA (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-
diagnostics/precision-medicine [https://perma.cc/6X8V-7FC9]. 
 13. In-Vitro Diagnostics, FDA (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/
products-and-medical-procedures/vitro-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/Y2KA-S3XW]. 
 14. Ulrich-Peter Rohr, Carmen Binder, Thomas Dieterle, Francesco Giusti, Carlo Guiseppe 
Mario Messina, Eduard Toerien, Holger Moch & Hans Hendrik Schäfer, The Value of In Vitro 
Diagnostic Testing in Medical Practice: A Status Report, PLOS ONE 2 (Mar. 4, 2016), https://
journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0149856&type=printable [https://
perma.cc/CJU7-VTLG].  
 15. Id. 
 16. Companion Diagnostics, FDA (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-
diagnostics/companion-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/H5XW-JLYN]. 
 17. The test can be ordered for early risk assessment of Down syndrome and other 
chromosomal abnormalities. Early Risk Assessment of Down Syndrome and Other Conditions, 
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precision medicine can “optimize[] treatment selection by focusing 
specific therapies on those most likely to benefit and decrease[] 
treatment harms by avoiding treatment in those unlikely to respond or 
predicted to have an adverse reaction to treatment.”18 This 
optimization can create cost savings that could “bend the health care 
cost curve.”19 
Attempts to patent such diagnostic methods and precision 
medicine techniques have resulted in a dizzying array of decisions from 
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.20 These cases leave open 
the question: Are diagnostic methods patent-eligible subject matter? 
Patent subject matter eligibility is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
which reads: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.21 
Facially, the statute allows for a wide expanse of patentable subject 
matter. This has been limited, however, by judicially created “implicit 
exception[s].”22 Namely, that “‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas’ are not patentable.’”23 These limits aim to prevent the 
patenting of subject matter that are “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work” and necessary for future innovation.24 
In the 2012 decision Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court established a two-step test for 




 18. COMM. ON POL’Y ISSUES IN THE CLINICAL DEV. & USE OF BIOMARKERS FOR 
MOLECULARLY TARGETED THERAPIES, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., BIOMARKER 
TESTS FOR MOLECULARLY TARGETED THERAPIES 28–29 (Laurene A. Graig, Jonathan K. 
Phillips & Harold L. Moses eds., 2016). 
 19. Id. at 29 (citation omitted). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 22. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012). 
 23. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). 
 24. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). 
 25. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 26. See id. at 77–78 (determining that the disputed patents “set forth laws of nature” and 
then asking whether they “do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations”). 
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“directed to” a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea?27 
If so, does it involve an “inventive concept” that transforms the claim 
into something more than a mere recitation of that law of nature?28 The 
patent at issue in Mayo involved a diagnostic method that correlated 
the concentration of drug metabolite in a patient with a dosing 
regimen.29 The Court held that the patent was invalid on subject matter 
grounds because the correlation itself was a law of nature, and the 
additional steps of adjusting the doses were “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity” that were “not sufficient to transform 
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those 
regularities.”30  
The decision immediately inspired worries that diagnostics and 
other precision medicines were similarly nonpatentable. Like the 
patent at issue in Mayo, many of these diagnostics are based on 
biological correlations or detectable biomarkers, which are both 
measurable indicators of the presence of a disease and how a patient is 
responding to treatment.31 Thus, as one practitioner predicted, Mayo 
could make it “very difficult to patent predictive diagnostic methods 
that depend on the presence or absence of a marker [in a patient’s 
system] . . . and diagnostic methods that compare the level of a 
biomarker to a normal or abnormal level of the marker.”32 Examples 
 
 27. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (applying the Mayo framework). 
 28. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–78, 82 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 29. Id. at 73–74. After a patient takes a drug, it is broken down (“metabolized”) in their 
system. Id. By measuring the amount of metabolite (broken-down drug) in the patient, doctors 
are able to tell how much of the drug the patient has absorbed and can accordingly adjust the 
patient’s future dosage. Id. See generally Jennifer Le, Drug Metabolism, MERCK MANUAL: 
CONSUMER VERSION (Oct. 2020), https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/drugs/administration-
and-kinetics-of-drugs/drug-metabolism [https://perma.cc/A57Y-6U3X] (“Genetic variations in 
how certain drugs (for example, statins) are transported into and out of the liver may increase a 
person’s risk of drug side effects or drug-related liver injury.”).  
 30. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79–80. 
 31. See Jennifer Gordon, The Impact of Myriad and Mayo: Will Advancements in the 
Biological Sciences Be Spurred or Disincentivized? (Or Was Biotech Patenting Not Complicated 
Enough?), COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSPS. MED., May 2015, at 10–11 (“The thinking in Myriad 
that isolated DNA is a patent-ineligible product of nature may well be extended to other purified 
natural substances.” (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 
(2013))). 
 32. Charlotte Harrison, Patent Watch, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 344, 344–45 
(2012) (quoting patent attorney Warren Woessner, who characterized the ruling as “extremely 
negative for companies and institutions attempting to develop assays that will be the cornerstone 
of personalized medicine”).  
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of such tests include assays for prostate cancer,33 potential early 
detection tests for Alzheimer’s disease,34 and other targeted cancer 
treatments, as “[p]atients with a variety of cancers routinely undergo 
molecular testing as part of patient care, enabling physicians to select 
treatments that improve chances of survival and reduce exposure to 
adverse effects.”35 
The lack of patent protection for these methods is concerning 
because diagnostic development requires significant up-front 
investment.36 Companies can spend millions before they have any 
chance to bring a diagnostic product to market.37 Without an ex ante 
guarantee of patent protection to ensure developers can recoup 
research and development costs, these developers may have little 
incentive or ability to develop diagnostics.38 
In light of Mayo, the pertinent question is how pharmaceutical 
companies can patent diagnostic methods and precision medicines, or 
more broadly, how pharmaceutical companies can be incentivized to 
even develop them in the first place. The Federal Circuit has tempered 
the Supreme Court’s harsh stance taken in Mayo, handing down some 
decisions that bow to Mayo’s precedent and invalidate diagnostic 
patents, and some that seem to flagrantly push past it in an attempt to 
save them.39 Altogether, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
decisions have left § 101 jurisprudence in a state of “chaos.”40 
 
 33. Id.; Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) Test, NIH: NAT’L CANCER INST. (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.cancer.gov/types/prostate/psa-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/5P4N-MQTL]. 
 34. Jonathan Graff-Radford, Alzheimer’s Test: Detection at the Earliest Stages, MAYO 
CLINIC (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/
expert-answers/alzheimers-test/faq-20057850 [https://perma.cc/R6XA-UM7N]. 
 35. Precision Medicine, supra note 12. 
 36. See infra Part I.B. 
 37. The cost is estimated to be between $20 million and $106 million. Doug Dolginow, 
Katherine Tynan, Noel Doheny & Peter Keeling, Mystery Solved! What Is the Cost To Develop 
and Launch a Diagnostic?, DIACEUTICS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.diaceutics.com/articles/
mystery-solved-what-is-the-cost-to-develop-and-launch-a-diagnostic [https://perma.cc/NBC2-6P
L3]. 
 38. See Gordon, supra note 31, at 10–11 (“The bottom line is that after Mayo, the USPTO 
will grant narrowly drafted claims of significantly less commercial value . . . . At some point, the 
narrowness of available claim scope from the USPTO will deter the patenting of these kinds of 
inventions, if not the vitally important research that underlies them.”). 
 39. See infra Part II. 
 40. Gene Quinn, Why the Federal Circuit Is To Blame for the 101 Crisis, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 
25, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/25/federal-circuit-blame-101-crisis [https://perma.cc/
U32M-DY2S]. 
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Given the confusion and unworkability of the Mayo test,41 
legislators have begun to take action, claiming that “[i]t’s time to 
restore America’s patent system” because current patent laws are 
“hostile to innovation.”42 Senators Chris Coons and Thom Tillis, then-
leaders of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property,43 released a bipartisan draft bill that seeks to overhaul the 
patent eligibility standards in § 101.44 The bill would abrogate the 
judicially created implicit exceptions in order to create a “clear legal 
framework for what types of innovations are patent eligible.”45 
However, this is not a problem that calls for a legislative 
sledgehammer, but a targeted, surgical intervention by the courts. 
Patent law, because it involves continuously evolving technologies and 
scientific advancements, requires dynamic and nuanced common law 
development, not a legislative override that could leave the patent 
statute in as much chaos as before.46 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the policy 
tensions at play in cases like Sequenom where companies seek to patent 
diagnostic methods and precision medicines. Part I also describes the 
current Supreme Court interpretation of § 101 under the Mayo test. 
 
 41. See David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2153–57 
(2017) (“[A]ll the Court has to show for its efforts is considerable confusion, a test that lacks 
administrability, and a result that presents the significant risk of reduced incentive to invent.”). 
 42. Chris Coons & Thom Tillis, It’s Time To Restore America’s Patent System, HILL (June 
10, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/447666-its-time-to-
restore-americas-patent-system [https://perma.cc/J87P-CW3H]. 
 43. Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, COMM. JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
about/subcommittees/subcommittee-on-intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/8HKW-TSVD].  
 44. Press Release, Off. of Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, 
and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text To Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019) 
[hereinafter Tillis-Coons Press Release], https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons
-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent
-act [https://perma.cc/73TR-9NL6]. The senators released their draft bill in May 2019 and the 
subcommittee held hearings on patent eligibility on June 4, 5, and 11, 2019. Id.; see also infra note 
156. They plan to rework the draft bill before presenting it to the Senate. Tillis-Coons Press 
Release, supra. Senator Patrick Leahy has since replaced Coons as the Democratic chair of the 
subcommittee. Dani Kass, AIA Namesake Leahy Takes Over Senate IP Subcommittee, LAW360 
(Feb. 16, 2021, 3:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1355100 [https://perma.cc/X2BW-
CYVY]. Tillis remains  the ranking member of the subcommittee, id., and has stated that 
“reforming eligibility jurisprudence is going to be one of [his] top priorities this Congress and [he] 
will use every opportunity [he has]—from the President-Elect’s USPTO nomination to amicus 
briefs before the Supreme Court—to achieve that goal.” @IanMichaelLopez, TWITTER (Jan. 19, 
2021, 5:22 PM), https://twitter.com/IanMichaelLopez/status/1351656290355974146 [https:// 
perma.cc/S7CR-28MV].  
 45. Coons & Tillis, supra note 42. 
 46. See infra Part III. 
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Part II describes how the Federal Circuit has struggled to apply that 
test, resulting in confusion and a clear need for intervention. Finally, 
Part III argues that the judiciary is better suited to fix § 101 standards 
than Congress, evaluates a proposed legislative amendment to § 101, 
and suggests a more flexible second step of Mayo which could filter 
meritorious patent claims from “junk patents” while still enabling the 
patenting of diagnostic methods.  
I.  PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND INNOVATION IN 
DIAGNOSTICS  
This Part surveys the statutory basis for patent subject matter 
eligibility and subsequent judicial interpretations of it. Then, it 
explores how eligibility is critical to the biopharmaceutical industry and 
the development of diagnostic methods. Finally, it explains the current 
test for determining patent subject matter eligibility, which has 
jeopardized the patentability of diagnostics. 
A. Section 101: The Statutory Threshold and Its Judicially Created 
Exceptions 
Patent protection under U.S. law stems from the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”47 This clause provides the 
constitutional hook for the Patent Act, which enables the government 
to grant exclusive rights to an inventor if an invention qualifies for a 
patent under the various requirements set out by the Act.48 Patent 
eligibility is a threshold validity determination governed by 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, which reads: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject 
to the conditions and requirements of this title.”49 This broad language, 
which dates back to the Thomas Jefferson–authored Patent Act of 
1793,50 has been constrained over time by three judicially created 
 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 48. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. The original language was “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter.” Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319. “Art” was replaced with 
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exceptions: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” 
are not patent eligible.51 As the Supreme Court has explained, “While 
these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they . . . have 
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis 
going back 150 years.”52 
These exceptions are primarily based on a preemption rationale, 
a concern that patent monopolies on “‘the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work’ . . . might tend to impede innovation more than it 
would tend to promote it.”53 Patent protection of such foundational 
elements of research might preempt future discoveries, hence why 
“Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could 
Newton have patented the law of gravity.”54 However, practical 
applications of laws of nature and abstract ideas “to a new and useful 
end” may be patent eligible.55 The difficulty is in evaluating exactly 
what constitutes a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea, 
absent a statutory definition for the terms, and what goes far enough 
to become a patentable practical application.56 The courts have 
adjudicated these determinations on a case-by-case basis such that “the 
scope of patentable subject matter has waxed and waned over time, 
depending on the trends of recent judicial decisions.”57 The most recent 
 
the more modern term “process” in 1952, and “process” was defined as “process, art, or method.” 
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, §§ 100–101, 66 Stat. 792, 797. This change did not alter the 
scope of § 101. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, Overview: Historical Development of Patent Law, at 
n.4, in CHISUM ON PATENTS (2020), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/063c39be-9e2d-42a1-
8dea-87175b936f9b [https://perma.cc/3C8S-7NY9] (“[As used in the 1793 Patent Act, t]he term 
‘art’ meant process or method.”). 
 51. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 52. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 174–75 (1853)).  
 53. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (quoting 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 
208, 216 (2014) (“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of 
pre-emption.”). 
 54. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 55. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 56. See Daniel J. Klein, The Integrity of Section 101: A “New and Useful” Test for Patentable 
Subject Matter, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 287, 289 (2011) (describing the judicial 
exceptions as “metaphysically vague and extra-statutory,” resulting in judges applying an “‘I 
know it when I see it’ test” when evaluating whether or not a claimed invention is an “abstract 
idea”). 
 57. KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45918, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
REFORM IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 12 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45918.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8WY-ZEUY]. 
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Supreme Court decisions on the topic have only served to further 
muddy the waters, particularly in the realm of biotechnology patents. 
These muddied waters are problematic for any party engaging in 
the patent system, including patent examiners, judges, and inventors. 
Patent examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
must attempt to apply the confusing rule on eligibility consistently 
across different fields of technology, and all in the limited time they 
have to evaluate each patent application.58 District court judges, 
themselves often not experts in patent law or technological sciences, 
must also apply the rule to varying bodies of technology and scientific 
invention. Further, the potential for invalidity under the unclear “law 
of nature” and “abstract idea” exceptions presents particular problems 
for biotechnology inventors whose inventions often involve “laws of 
nature” on some level and who require incentives to initiate the 
expensive research and development process in the first place.  
B. Diagnostics Require Innovation Incentives 
The patentability concerns implicated by the judicially created 
exceptions are pronounced in the area of diagnostic technology, where 
inventions focus on testing biomarkers or other biological processes 
that could be considered “laws of nature.” Diagnosis has been called 
“the foundation of medicine,” and while developing diagnostic 
methods and precision medicines “does not assure effective 
treatment, . . . it is unequivocally the place to start.”59 A study of how 
diagnostics are used in medical practice shows that they are a crucial 
tool in patient management, and that developing “[n]ew markers 
should deliver actionable and medically relevant information[] to guide 
decision-making and foster improved patient outcomes.”60 The 
COVID-19 pandemic made clear the importance of diagnostics: in the 
“greatest public health challenge of the 21st century,” the United 
States’ lack of “high-quality diagnostics . . . resulted in inaccurate 
patient identification and poor epidemiological characterization of 
 
 58. For a detailed discussion of how time allotment at the PTO affects patent issuance, see 
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. 
L. REV. 975, 982–87 (2019). 
 59. COMM. ON A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING A NEW TAXONOMY OF DISEASE, NAT’L 
RSCH. COUNCIL, TOWARD PRECISION MEDICINE: BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE NETWORK FOR 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND A NEW TAXONOMY OF DISEASE 79 (2011), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK91503/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK91503.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M28-RM4S]. 
 60. Rohr et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
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viral spread,” which ultimately led to “fewer patients being tested and 
rapid spread of the virus.”61 
Development of diagnostic tools is not cheap. One panel of 
experts estimates the average cost of developing and commercializing 
a diagnostic is between $20 million and $106 million.62 For precision 
medicines, which consist of a companion diagnostic paired with a 
treatment, the cost of developing the diagnostic must be added to the 
cost of developing the drug as well, which is estimated to be in the 
billions of dollars.63 Furthermore, to be marketed to doctors for 
eventual patient use, most drugs and diagnostics must receive 
regulatory clearance from the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”)—a process that comes with its own costs.64 The economic 
incentive of patent protection for the treatment drug alone may not be 
sufficient to assure a drug developer that investment in a companion 
diagnostic will be worthwhile; whereas granting patent protection for 
the diagnostic as well as the treatment drug would provide a stronger 
incentive for the development of precision medicines. 
Strong incentives are particularly vital to encourage research and 
development in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, 
which encompass both drug and diagnostic development. Technologies 
and drugs in these industries are “very expensive to develop but 
relatively cheap to reproduce.”65 Not only are drugs expensive to 
develop, but they can also take over thirty years to progress from the 
research and development stage to FDA approval.66 Furthermore, 
 
 61. Chaarushena Deb, Osman Moneer & W. Nicholson Price II, Covid-19, Single-Sourced 
Diagnostic Tests, and Innovation Policy, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, Jan.–June 2020, at 1–2.  
 62. Dolginow et al., supra note 37.  
 63. The average cost of developing a drug and obtaining FDA approval is roughly $2.6 
billion. Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 31 (2016). 
 64. Development & Approval Process | Drugs, FDA (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/development-approval-process-drugs [https://perma.cc/M5W7-2ZUE]; Overview of IVD 
Regulation, FDA (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/ivd-regulatory-assistance/
overview-ivd-regulation [https://perma.cc/MN98-7XQ4].  
 65. Anatole Krattiger, Promoting Access to Medical Innovation, WIPO MAG. (Sept. 2013), 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/05/article_0002.html [https://perma.cc/H5Y4-989T]. 
 66. The median time to develop a drug from initial research on novel drug targets to FDA 
approval is thirty-six years. Laura M. McNamee, Michael Jay Walsh & Fred D. Ledley, Timelines of 
Translational Science: From Technology Initiation to FDA Approval, PLOS ONE 1 (May 8, 2017), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0177371&type=printable [https://
perma.cc/3PN8-DKUP]; see also Fred D. Ledley, 30 Years Is Too Long To Wait for New Medicines. 
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drug development is a risky endeavor—more than 90 percent of drug 
candidates fail before reaching the clinical testing phase,67 and this 
comes after companies have already invested significant funds into 
developing them. Generic imitations, on the other hand, take 
significantly less time and money to develop once the novel drug has 
come to market, given that the patent describing the drug has already 
been published.68 Thus, to remain financially viable, ex ante assurance 
of patent protection is necessary to incentivize companies to invest in 
research, development, and regulatory approval. 
As personalized medicine becomes the way of the future, patients 
will want to know more about their own disease susceptibility. 
Research into genetic markers of disease will continue to grow. 
However, if one can only obtain a patent on an actual treatment rather 
than on a diagnostic test, there will be little incentive for the biopharma 
industry to transform the basic genetic research into a diagnostic that 
doctors and patients can actually use.  
C. Striking a Balance Between Innovation Incentives and Preemption 
In determining patent eligibility, there is a risk of being both 
overinclusive and underinclusive; of granting too many patents to 
undeserving inventions or failing to protect deserving ones. To combat 
these extremes, the vital patent protections necessary to promote 
diagnostic development must be balanced with the primary concern 
underlying § 101: preemption. The lack of a proper test to sort between 
meritorious patent claims and claims wholly directed to laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas creates a risk of tying up the 
“building blocks” of research and impeding future research.69 Indeed, 
 
There Are Ways To Speed Up Drug Development, STAT (June 6, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/
2018/06/06/drug-development-speed-new-medicines [https://perma.cc/HY6M-YGY8]. 
 67. See Helen Dowden & Jamie Munro, Trends in Clinical Success Rates and Therapeutic 
Focus, 18 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 495, 495 (2019); Michael Hay, David W. Thomas, 
John L. Craighead, Celia Economides & Jesse Rosenthal, Clinical Development Success Rates for 
Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 41 (2014).  
 68. The median time for a generic to receive FDA approval was 296 days. FDA OFF. OF 
PLANNING, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE GENERIC DRUG USER 
FEE AMENDMENTS 30 (n.d.), https://www.fda.gov/media/130572/download [https://perma.cc/
SUZ8-VPUY]. 
 69. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“We have ‘repeatedly 
emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up 
the future use of’ these building blocks of human ingenuity.” (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012))); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120–21 (1853) 
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§ 101 exists to “identify certain patents or categories of patents that 
should not be granted because their economic harms exceed their 
benefits.”70 Thus, overbroad patents should be denied patent 
protection due to their chilling effect on downstream innovation.  
In addition to chilling downstream innovation, a poorly 
formulated test risks blocking downstream innovation entirely by 
extending the power of patent protection to discoveries with little 
innovative value. Attempts to patent marginally innovative 
developments—a practice pejoratively deemed “evergreening”—can 
extend the life of brand-name drug patents, delaying the introduction 
of generics to market and driving up prescription drug costs.71 Critics 
of evergreening claim that “by obtaining later patents on 
improvements or ancillary aspects of a pharmaceutical, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers effectively extend patent protection beyond the term 
set by Congress, deterring follow-on competitors and keeping prices 
high,” and these later patents are often of “questionable value and 
validity.”72 An effective test would filter out these patents, too. 
Unfortunately, the current test established by the Supreme Court has 
not effectively navigated the space between innovation and 
preemption and instead has left the lower courts with a confusing 
standard, often inconsistently applied. 
D. The Modern Framework: The Mayo Test  
Beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court took a renewed interest in 
patent subject matter eligibility, handing down four decisions on the 
topic in five years.73 Altogether, these cases yielded the current 
iteration of the Mayo two-step test for determining subject matter 
eligibility for process patents.74 The Court first established the test in 
 
(explaining that claiming more than what one has invented is forbidden because it “prevents 
others from attempting to improve upon the manner and process . . . described in [the] 
specification—and may deter the public from using it”). 
 70. HICKEY, supra note 57, at 25 (surveying rationales for § 101). 
 71. Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590, 596 
(2018).  
 72. KEVIN J. HICKEY, ERIN H. WARD & WEN W. SHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45666, DRUG 
PRICING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 
14 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45666 [https://perma.cc/YMK5-M65U]. 
 73. The series began with Bilski in 2010, followed by Mayo in 2012, Myriad in 2013, and Alice 
in 2014. 
 74. Process claims “differ[] fundamentally from the other three classes (machine, 
manufacture, and composition of matter). A process is not a structural entity but rather an 
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the diagnostic context in Mayo, and then further developed it in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International,75 which dealt with a software patent.76 
The first step of the test asks whether the patent claim is “directed to” 
a patent-ineligible concept.77 For example, is the claim focused on 
measuring a natural correlation in the body, like the rate of absorption 
of a drug—something that could be deemed a “law of nature”? Or does 
it claim something clearly outside the judicially created exceptions of a 
law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea, like a novel 
method for artificially editing genes?78 If the patent claim is not 
directed to an exception, then the invention is patent eligible. If it is 
directed to one of the judicial exceptions, then the analysis proceeds to 
the second step. 
Mayo’s second step asks whether the claimed patent involves an 
“inventive concept” that transforms the claim into something more 
than a mere recitation of a law of nature or abstract idea.79 At this step, 
the court “consider[s] the elements of each claim both individually and 
‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional 
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible 
application.”80 This “inventive concept” cannot be “well-understood, 
routine, conventional,” as such activity “is normally not sufficient to 
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible 
application of such a law.”81  
 
operation or series of steps leading to a useful result.” CHISUM, supra note 50, § 1.03 (footnote 
omitted). 
 75. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 76. The test is also known as the Mayo/Alice test. 
 77. Alice, 573 U.S at 217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 
U.S. 66, 77–78 (2012)).  
 78. CRISPR, a new research tool developed in 2012, allows scientists to precisely edit genes 
in the lab in a way that has revolutionized biological research. Heidi Ledford & Ewen Callaway, 
Pioneers of Revolutionary CRISPR Gene Editing Win Chemistry Nobel, NATURE (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02765-9 [https://perma.cc/GT34-RHBX]. The 
scientists who developed CRISPR won the 2020 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for their work. Id. 
CRISPR is the subject of several patents and extensive patent litigation. See, e.g., Jon Cohen, 
Surprise Patent Ruling Revives High-Stakes Dispute over the Genome Editor CRISPR, SCI. (June 
26, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/surprise-patent-ruling-revives-
high-stakes-dispute-over-genome-editor-crispr [https://perma.cc/Y3HM-88VT]; U.S. Patent No. 
10,308,961 (filed July 11, 2018) (directed to “[m]ethods and compositions for RNA-directed target 
DNA modification and for RNA-directed modulation of transcription”). 
 79. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 561 U.S. at 78). 
 80. Id. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 561 U.S. at 78–79). 
 81. Mayo, 561 U.S. at 79. 
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The patent directly at issue in Mayo involved a diagnostic method 
that correlated a patient’s unique drug metabolism to a dosing scheme 
in an effort to optimize drug treatment for autoimmune diseases.82 If a 
test showed a patient had a certain concentration of broken-down drug 
in their blood, then the doctor should adjust their treatment 
accordingly to give a more precise, effective dose.83 The Court held the 
claim to be patent ineligible because the correlation itself was a law of 
nature, and the additional step of adjusting the dose was the sort of 
“well-understood, routine, conventional activity . . . [that is normally] 
not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into 
patentable applications of those regularities.”84 Altogether, the method 
“amount[ed] to nothing significantly more than an instruction to 
doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients.”85 
The Mayo decision was strong medicine, stronger than necessary 
to weed out the particular patent it evaluated. Though the patented 
method could be seen as only a marginal improvement—it “optimized” 
a test and dosing procedure that doctors already recognized and 
performed86—the Court did not need to use such a sweeping test to 
eliminate it. The Patent Act lays out other requirements for obtaining 
a patent, like novelty or nonobviousness, which could have been used 
to invalidate the patent.87 Instead, the Court unnecessarily left the 
patent bar with a controversial and confusing new test.88 
 
 82. Id. at 73–74. 
 83. Id. at 74–75. 
 84. Id. at 79–80. 
 85. Id. at 79. 
 86. Dennis Crouch, Mayo v. Prometheus: Medical Methods and Patentable Subject Matter at 
the Supreme Court, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 28, 2009), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/mayo-v-
prometheus-medical-methods-and-patentable-subject-matter-at-the-supreme-court.html [https://
perma.cc/MDC9-ZYTH] (“[T]he general iterative process is well known, what makes the 
Prometheus claims novel is that they identify the particular thresholds that are important (e.g., 
230 pmol).”). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (codifying the novelty requirement); id. § 103 (codifying the 
nonobviousness requirement). 
 88. Compare Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-
prometheus [https://perma.cc/3A82-ALWU] (arguing that the Mayo framework conflates patent 
eligibility with novelty and nonobviousness), with Julie Samuels, The Supreme Court Gets It Right: 
No Patents on Laws of Nature, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/03/supreme-court-gets-it-right-no-patents-laws-nature [https://perma.cc/J79N-
EM3S] (arguing that Mayo correctly reaffirms that “laws of nature . . . are not patentable”). 
NGUYEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2021  8:03 PM 
1646  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1631 
With the decision came concerns that the new test would render 
diagnostics and other precision medicines nonpatentable, since many 
are based on biological correlations. The Biotechnology Industry 
Organization, the world’s largest trade association representing 
biotechnology companies and institutions worldwide, released a 
statement decrying the ruling and criticizing the Court for “fail[ing] to 
appropriately recognize the importance of personalized medicine, and 
of the research and investment incentives needed to develop new 
individualized therapies for untreated diseases.”89  
Others saw it as a victory for patients and medical research, 
confirming that “[m]edical innovations that provide insight into natural 
human biology must remain freely accessible and widely 
disseminated.”90 The American Medical Association released a 
statement in support, saying that Mayo protected physicians’ ability to 
“consider[] all relevant scientific information when reviewing 
diagnostic test results” without fear of “encounter[ing] a vast thicket of 
exclusive rights” that would have precluded them.91 But it is not clear 
that such a sweeping standard was required to prevent that result. 
Indeed, the patent at issue in Mayo was not particularly new or useful 
and could have been invalidated on novelty or utility grounds, rather 
than on subject matter eligibility grounds. The patent took an already 
existing practice and merely made it more precise. By establishing such 
a broad test—which the Federal Circuit has subsequently struggled to 
apply—to invalidate it, the Court created what a former PTO director 
and the former chief judge of the Federal Circuit have called an 
“uncertain patent climate [that] has a chilling effect on innovation in 
biosciences to the detriment of public health.”92  
Notably absent from the decision were any guiding criteria for 
determining inventiveness under the second step, leading some 
 
 89. Hans Sauer, Mayo v. Prometheus: BIO Statement on Supreme Court Decision, 
BIOTECHNOW (Mar. 20, 2012), https://dev.bio.org/blogs/mayo-v-prometheus-bio-statement-
supreme-court-decision [https://perma.cc/7WX2-GFTE].  
 90. Press Release, Robert M. Wah, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Welcomes Supreme Court 
Decision To Invalidate Prometheus Patents (Mar. 20, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/
20120322204224/http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2012-03-20-supreme-court-decision-
prometheus-patents.page.  
 91. Id.  
 92. David J. Kappos & Paul R. Michel, Supreme Court Patent Decisions Are Stifling Health 
Care Innovation, MORNING CONSULT (Oct. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://morningconsult.com/
opinions/supreme-court-patent-decisions-stifling-health-care-innovation [https://perma.cc/4FV7-
TW7M]. 
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commentators to predict that the decision’s “fairly unclear language” 
leaves wriggle room for the Federal Circuit to apply the test at varying 
levels of discretion.93 Some worried that patent examiners and lower 
courts would “struggle to consistently and rationally implement” the 
“new and confusing” test.94 This was prescient, as the subsequent case 
law has borne out. Exactly what kind of steps are sufficiently 
“inventive” to be transformative is still unclear, as the Federal Circuit 
has applied the test in a dizzying variety of ways, sometimes saving 
diagnostic patents and sometimes casting them aside. 
II.  MAYO’S FAILURE: THE FIGHT TO SAVE DIAGNOSTICS AT THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
The Federal Circuit, limited by Mayo but recognizing the value in 
diagnostics, has “signaled a willingness to find valid diagnostic method 
claims,” increasingly pushing the Mayo boundary over time.95 This Part 
explores four Federal Circuit cases post-Mayo that evaluated the 
eligibility of biotechnology process patents and came to drastically 
different conclusions, demonstrating the need for clarification of § 101. 
A. Mayo Over-Filters: Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 
Fears about the Mayo test over-filtering patents were realized at 
the Federal Circuit in 2015, when application of the test resulted in the 
invalidation of a legitimately useful discovery. The patent at issue in 
Sequenom claimed a novel, noninvasive method of prenatal testing 
using fetal DNA found in maternal plasma or serum, materials that had 
previously been routinely discarded.96 The new method allowed 
patients to avoid the risks of the commonly used, invasive prenatal 
testing techniques that took samples from the fetus or the placenta.97 
Nonetheless, the court found the test patent ineligible because it was 
directed at the natural phenomenon of fetal DNA, and because the 
subsequent steps of amplifying and detecting the DNA were routine 
 
 93. Harrison, supra note 32, at 344–45 (quoting Hank Greely, director of the Center for Law 
and the Biosciences at Stanford University).  
 94. Sauer, supra note 89. 
 95. Adil Moghal & Gaby L. Longsworth, INSIGHT: The Latest in Patenting Diagnostic 
Methods, BLOOMBERG L.: IP L. NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
ip-law/insight-the-latest-in-patenting-diagnostic-methods [https://perma.cc/AA6B-W7CR]. 
 96. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 97. Id. at 1373. 
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and conventional at the time the patent was issued.98 Ultimately, the 
court reasoned that the method “amount[ed] to a general instruction 
to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques when seeking to 
detect [fetal] cffDNA,” and therefore was “not new and useful.”99 The 
only new and useful part of the claim was the discovery of the fetal 
DNA in the maternal plasma, which, standing alone, could not be 
patented.100 
In an early pushback to the Supreme Court’s § 101 jurisprudence, 
Judge Richard Linn concurred in the opinion but wrote separately to 
emphasize that he did so only because he was “bound by the sweeping 
language of the test set out in Mayo.”101 He took issue with Mayo’s 
overly broad second step requiring sufficient inventiveness, explaining 
that Sequenom “represent[ed] the consequence . . . in excluding a 
meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and 
should have been entitled to retain.”102 He thought that Mayo had 
wrongly “discounted, seemingly without qualification, any ‘[p]ost-
solution activity that is purely conventional or obvious,’” which 
standing alone might not warrant protection, but, taken together in 
combination, might constitute a novel process that did merit patent 
protection.103 The post-solution activity in Mayo, the dosage 
adjustment, was already being performed by doctors at the time; the 
patent merely made the adjustment more precise.104 In Sequenom, no 
one had been amplifying and detecting the fetal DNA in maternal 
plasma—the steps, though conventional, were a new use “deserving of 
patent protection.”105  
 
 98. Id. at 1377. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012)). 
 104. Id. at 1380–81.  
 105. Id. at 1381. Sequenom, which had pioneered the technology and brought it to market, 
lost its patent while attempting to assert it against competitors that had quickly brought similar 
noninvasive prenatal tests to market. This had created a competitive environment in a growing 
market. Michael Gibney, Diagnostics: Illumina, Ariosa and Sequenom, FIERCE BIOTECH (Oct. 
21, 2014, 8:10 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/special-report/diagnostics-illumina-ariosa-
and-sequenom [https://perma.cc/RU4K-FTJL]. After some financial struggles, Sequenom was 
acquired by LabCorp, through which doctors can now order the test, along with other 
competitors. Frank Vinluan, LabCorp Boosts Prenatal Testing Presence with $371M Sequenom 
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Judge Linn was not alone: upon denial of a rehearing en banc, 
other Federal Circuit judges expressed a similar concern about Mayo’s 
restrictive nature but agreed that they must bow to precedent.106 Many 
thought Sequenom was the ideal vehicle for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari and clarify their patent eligibility jurisprudence.107 The 
Court declined, and so the Federal Circuit resorted to more extreme 
measures.  
B. Carving out Safe Harbors: Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. 
CellzDirect, Inc. and Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd. 
One year later, the Federal Circuit took the opposite tack in 
demonstrating Mayo’s weaknesses: it held valid a method patent that, 
facially, did not seem particularly “inventive” at all. The patent at issue 
in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.108 described a 
method of extending the lifespan of cryopreserved hepatocytes, a type 
of liver cell.109 Prior to the inventors’ discovery, it was thought that the 
cells could only survive one freeze–thaw cycle.110 The inventors 
subjected the cells to a second freeze–thaw cycle, found that the cells 
were still viable, and thus claimed their refreezing method.111  
 
Deal, XCONOMY (July 27, 2016), https://xconomy.com/raleigh-durham/2016/07/27/labcorp-
boosts-prenatal-testing-presence-with-371m-sequenom-deal [https://perma.cc/H73F-92XZ]. 
 106. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc).  
 107. E.g., Paul Cole, Ariosa v Sequenom—A Path to the Supreme Court?, PATENT DOCS 
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/12/guest-post-ariosa-v-sequenom-a-path-to-
the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/S2AW-K3ZL] (summarizing the arguments of amici 
from industry, academia, research institutions, and arguing for grant of certiorari); Bart 
Eppenauer, Section 101 – Pivotal Moment for Clarity on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 21, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/section-subject-
eligibility.html [https://perma.cc/HE9U-Z65Q] (“[T]he Supreme Court should agree to hear 
the Sequenom case and clarify (or revise) its Mayo/Alice test to ensure that meritorious 
inventions in life sciences and software remain patentable.”); Gene Quinn, SCOTUS Blog 
Founder Asks Supreme Court To Reconsider Mayo Ruling in Sequenom v. Ariosa, IPWATCHDOG 
(Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/03/21/scotus-supreme-court-reconsider-
mayo-sequenom-ariosa [https://perma.cc/HSC2-VUE8] (“It is time for the Supreme Court to 
stand up and face the music. If they did not intent [sic] to render groundbreaking medical 
innovations patent ineligible they must take this case and they must place real, consequential 
limits on Mayo.”). 
 108. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 109. Id. at 1045. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
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The Federal Circuit held that the method passed Mayo’s first step 
because it was not directed to a patent-ineligible judicial exception, but 
rather “to a new and useful laboratory technique”: “a ‘method of 
producing a desired preparation of multi-cryopreserved 
hepatocytes.’”112 So, it was more than a mere unpatentable observation 
of the “natural law” of “the cells’ capability of surviving multiple 
freeze-thaw cycles.”113 Therefore, this claim satisfied the first step. But 
even if it had failed, the court reasoned that the patent would have been 
eligible under the second step because it “improve[d] an existing 
technological process.”114  
So, by artfully claiming the technique as a “method of producing,” 
rather than merely “optimizing” (as in the Mayo patent)115 or 
“detecting” (as in the Sequenom patent),116 the patentee successfully 
avoided Mayo’s § 101 filter. It is unsettling that clever manipulations 
of claim language could allow the facially basic process of putting cells 
back in the freezer to be patent eligible, whereas a method that brought 
about a “global transformation of prenatal care” was left by the 
wayside.117 However, the Federal Circuit has continued to use these 
linguistic hooks as tools to evade Mayo. 
In continuing its quest to refine Mayo’s filtering function and 
further push the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Federal Circuit then 
essentially flipped its result in Sequenom and held a similar diagnostic 
method patent eligible. In Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. West-Ward 
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.,118 the court found eligible a patent 
claim for a “method for treating” schizophrenia that determined a 
patient’s genotype, which correlated with their ability to metabolize a 
schizophrenia drug, and then instructed the physician to dose the 
patient accordingly.119 The court distinguished it from Mayo by 
pointing to the explicit instruction in the Vanda patent to “internally 
administer[]” the drug in certain amounts, which meant the patent was 
directed to a “method of treatment” and a “new way of using an 
 
 112. Id. at 1048 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,604,929 col. 19 l. 56 (filed Apr. 21, 2005)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1050 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014)). 
 115. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 10, l. 10 (filed Apr. 8, 1999). 
 116. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 23, l. 61 (filed Mar. 4, 1998). 
 117. See Bianchi & Chiu, supra note 5, at 464 (discussing how sequence analysis of cell-free 
DNA fragments in pregnant women has changed prenatal clinical care). 
 118. Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 119. Id. at 1121. 
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existing drug.”120 It was an “application of [the] relationship” between 
the patient’s genotype, drug metabolism, and treatment, rather than an 
observation of that relationship.121 Therefore, the patent satisfied the 
first step: taken altogether, the patent constituted a “method of 
treatment,” rather than a “diagnostic method” that indicated a need to 
change dosage, and, therefore, the court did not need to continue to 
the second step.122 Again, by relying on an insubstantial linguistic 
distinction, the court carved out a safe harbor for so-called “method of 
treatment” patents.123 
Commentators agree that this seems like a distinction without a 
difference and that, in reality, Mayo and Vanda are 
“both . . . diagnostic and treatment oriented.”124 It appears that having 
had their invitation to grant certiorari in Sequenom refused, the 
Federal Circuit tried to force the Supreme Court’s hand through 
Vanda. Indeed, one law professor said that a denial of rehearing en 
banc in Vanda would be “a high flaunting of Supreme Court 
precedent.”125 Regardless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to deny the 
en banc rehearing.126 The Solicitor General’s office, invited by the 
Supreme Court to file a brief on whether or not to grant certiorari in 
 
 120. Id. at 1134–35. 
 121. Id. at 1135. 
 122. Id. at 1134–35. 
 123. From a claim-drafting standpoint, these linguistic distinctions—a pro forma additional 
“now apply!” step—could be seen as narrowing the claims. However, from the standpoint of an 
ordinary scientist or a nonspecialist jurist, they appear to be a textual workaround for Mayo. The 
drafters have taken a biological correlation and added an insubstantial instruction to apply the 
correlation to a treatment, magically transforming the diagnostic into a patentable invention. 
District court judges and Supreme Court Justices who are not steeped in the details of claim 
drafting would likely see the essence of the claims as no different from one case to another—yet 
one is patentable under Mayo and the other fails. A general patent-eligibility standard should be 
accessible to all district court judges, not just patent claim drafters, so they can more easily apply 
it to such claims.  
 124. Dennis Crouch, Vanda on Rehearing: Will the Federal Circuit Defy SCOTUS?, 
PATENTLY-O (June 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/06/rehearing-federal-
circuit.html [https://perma.cc/HCE3-CWCH]; Stephanie Sivinski, Vanda v. West-Ward: This 
Time, Dosage Adjustment Claims Are Patent Eligible Subject Matter, IPWATCHDOG (May 16, 
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/16/vanda-v-west-ward-dosage-adjustment-claims-
patent-eligible [https://perma.cc/N3CF-JQVC] (“While the subject matter-eligibility inquiry 
inherently requires some line-drawing, the court relied on a very thin line to distinguish Vanda’s 
claims from Mayo’s ineligible ones.”).  
 125. Crouch, supra note 124. 
 126. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam) (denying reh’g en banc). 
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Vanda, recommended denying certiorari, agreeing with the Federal 
Circuit’s holding on “methods of medical treatment” and pointing out 
that “[h]istorically, such methods were well understood to be patent-
eligible.”127 However, the solicitor general acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court’s § 101 decisions—and Mayo in particular—“have 
fostered substantial uncertainty” and recommended the Court instead 
look at a case that has generated the most significant discord at the 
Federal Circuit: Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, LLC.128 
C. A Cry for Help: Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services 
No clearer are the fault lines in the Federal Circuit than those 
presented in the recent fractured decision in Athena. There, the court 
invalidated a patent on a new method for diagnosing myasthenia 
gravis, a neurological disorder, by detecting certain antibodies.129 
Reluctantly, the court held the claim was not patent eligible under 
Mayo. Instead, it was directed to the detection of a natural law—the 
correlation between the antibodies and myasthenia gravis—and 
because it did not include a treatment element, it lacked any 
sufficiently inventive further step.130 Upon denial of rehearing en banc, 
it became clear that all of the judges of the Federal Circuit agreed that 
the claims should be patent eligible—they only disagreed whether 
Mayo required them to declare the claims patent ineligible.131 
The denial of rehearing en banc produced eight different opinions: 
four concurring in the denial and four dissenting.132 Many of the 
opinions expressed either frustration with the Mayo test, frustration 
with the Federal Circuit’s inability to overrule it (especially given the 
 
 127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, 8, Hikma Pharms. USA Inc. v. Vanda 
Pharms. Inc., 140 S. Ct. 911 (2020) (mem.) (No. 18-817). 
 128. Id. at 8, 22 (citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam)). 
 129. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 746–47 (Fed. 
Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).  
 130. Athena Diagnostics, 915 F.3d at 750, 753–57. 
 131. Athena v. Mayo: A Splintered Federal Circuit Invites Supreme Court or Congress To Step 
Up on 101 Chaos, IPWATCHDOG (July 8, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/08/splintered-
federal-circuit-invites-supreme-court-review-athena-v-mayo [https://perma.cc/A944-4CMM]. 
 132. Athena Diagnostics, 927 F.3d at 1334. 
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resulting treatment of diagnostic patents), or both.133 The judges 
encouraged the Supreme Court to intervene and clarify its 
interpretation of § 101.134 Notably, Judge Todd Hughes queried 
whether congressional action may be necessary: “[F]urther explication 
of eligibility standards in the area of diagnostics patents . . . might come 
from Congress, with its distinctive role in making the factual and policy 
determinations relevant to setting the proper balance of innovation 
incentives under patent law.”135 Judge Kathleen O’Malley actively 
encouraged Congress to step in and fix the judiciary’s mistakes by 
amending the Patent Act to clarify that there was no “inventive 
concept” requirement.136 Despite the solicitor general and the Federal 
Circuit’s respective pleas, the Supreme Court denied cert in Athena, 
Vanda, and all other § 101 cases of the 2019 Term.137 
The Federal Circuit judges are well aware of the policy 
justifications and need for patents on diagnostics, and they believe 
Mayo either obstructs innovation in the field or, at the very least, is too 
broad and unworkable in its current form to effectively differentiate 
bad patents from meritorious ones. Though this unworkability 
 
 133. Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc) (“I also agree . . . that 
the bottom line for diagnostics patents is problematic. But this is not a problem that we can solve. 
As an inferior appellate court, we are bound by the Supreme Court.”); id. at 1339 (Dyk, J., 
concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc) (“I share the concerns expressed by my dissenting 
colleagues that the Mayo test for patent eligibility should leave room for sufficiently specific 
diagnostic patents. But it is the Supreme Court, not this court, that must reconsider the breadth 
of Mayo.”); id. at 1354 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc) (“We have turned 
Mayo into a per se rule that diagnostic kits and techniques are ineligible. That per se rule is ‘too 
broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle [which] could eviscerate patent law.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 
66, 71 (2012)). 
 134. Judge Hughes noted that  
further explication of eligibility standards in the area of diagnostics patents . . . could 
permit patenting of essential life saving inventions based on natural laws while 
providing a reasonable and measured way to differentiate between overly broad 
patents claiming natural laws and truly worthy specific applications. Such an 
explication might come from the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc); see also id. at 1343–44 (Dyk, J., 
concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc) (“[T]his case could provide the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to refine the Mayo framework as to diagnostic patents.”); id. at 1344 (Chen, J., 
concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc) (same). 
 135. Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of reh’g en banc).  
 136. Id. at 1371–72 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc).  
 137. See Eileen McDermott, It’s Official: SCOTUS Will Not Unravel Section 101 Web, 
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/13/scotus-will-not-unravel-
section-101-web [https://perma.cc/25WM-XLTK] (discussing the denials of certiorari and the 
solicitor general’s request for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Athena).  
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admittedly came from the courts, it should nevertheless be the courts 
who remedy it through a targeted intervention, rather than the 
legislative sledgehammer that Congress might wield. 
III.  SAVING § 101 THROUGH JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT RATHER 
THAN LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE 
This Part first discusses how the current Mayo standard for 
determining patent eligibility cannot continue. It then argues that, 
compared to the blunt instrument that is congressional legislation, 
courts are best suited to remedy that standard, and it suggests one way 
the doctrine could be adjusted to allow for diagnostic patents. 
A. The Current Mayo Test Is Unworkable 
The Mayo test’s overbroad language is unworkable, as evidenced 
by the Federal Circuit’s struggles to apply it and reach results they 
consider just. It is confusing138 and vague, leading some decisions to 
turn merely on clever claim drafting.139 Because almost every 
biotechnological invention is based at some point on a law of nature or 
natural phenomena to some extent, the test’s first step automatically 
casts doubt on every attempt to patent a diagnostic method.140 This 
would not be so problematic if the second step of Mayo were better 
tailored to evaluate the inventiveness of a claimed method. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on the second 
step has led to confusingly disparate treatment of similar diagnostic or 
treatment claims,141 depending on a judge’s willingness to squint at the 
claim and work to find patentability. 
The uncertain standards of the test are also unworkable for the 
public and the industry at large. Without assurance that their efforts 
will actually be protected by a patent and provide a return on 
investment, companies will be unwilling to pursue the lengthy and 
 
 138. See David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158–59 (2016) 
(discussing the confusion caused by the current test for patent eligibility). 
 139. See supra Part II.B. 
 140. Athena Diagnostics, 927 F.3d at 1354 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en 
banc) (“We have turned Mayo into a per se rule that diagnostic kits and techniques are ineligible. 
That per se rule is ‘too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle [which] could 
eviscerate patent law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012))). 
 141. See supra Part II. 
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expensive research process necessary to develop the diagnostics.142 
Though it may seem like the standard is so flawed that a legislative 
override is the best option for solving this unworkability, the nature of 
patent law and the dynamic landscape that lies beneath it counsel 
otherwise. 
B. The Judiciary Is Better Suited to Fixing § 101 than Congress 
Patent law has long been one of the few areas of federal common 
law for a reason—patents, because they often deal with technology and 
science, are a fast-developing and ever-changing area.143 Through 
common law development, it is easier for judges to nimbly respond and 
surgically intervene in such areas than it is for Congress, who must deal 
with the legislative process and its many stalling points.144 Generally, 
administrative agencies fill this role,145 but given that the PTO currently 
lacks substantive rulemaking authority,146 either Congress or the courts 
must shape patent law. 
Courts are well versed in developing laws over time. Patent law, 
like other areas of federal common law, is governed by a common law 
“enabling” statute that authorizes the courts to make and develop the 
 
 142. WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF SHERRY M. KNOWLES, PRINCIPAL, KNOWLES INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY STRATEGIES, LLC, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ON “THE STATE OF PATENT 
ELIGIBILITY IN AMERICA, PART I” 28 (2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Knowles%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7FQ-7J8L].  
 143. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 
53, 55 (2010) (“[T]he common law has been the dominant legal force in the development of U.S. 
patent law for over two hundred years . . . . [P]atent law has and must continue to adapt to a 
changing world of technological innovation.”). 
 144. For a discussion of these “vetogates” and their effect on delegating lawmaking and law-
elaborating authority to agencies and the courts, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, 
Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008). 
 145. As Professor Jonathan Masur notes, 
Agency attempts to regulate industries and markets characterized by rapid 
advancements with permanent regulations—and permanent regulations that operate 
on the vanguard of technology—thus hold the possibility of catalyzing significant error 
costs if the regulatory terrain shifts quickly. Yet these are precisely the circumstances 
under which an agency’s expertise is of greatest value, and in which agencies have the 
greatest institutional advantages vis à vis other decisionmaking bodies. 
Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 1021, 1071 (2007). 
 146. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 279 (arguing that the 
PTO should be given substantive rulemaking authority in line with other agencies who must deal 
with developing technology, like the EPA). 
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law.147 These statutes “effectively empower[] courts to act like agencies 
do.”148 However, “[c]ourts develop the law in the context of specific 
cases and controversies rather than via generally applicable 
regulations.”149 These congressional delegations of lawmaking power 
to courts and agencies require “an interpretive approach that is both 
flexible and sensitive to policy.”150 In interpreting these common law 
statutes, courts apply a “relaxed” version of statutory stare decisis, 
allowing them to adjust their interpretations of statutes and overrule 
past interpretations over time.151 
Congress, on the other hand, is not well-equipped to do the kind 
of fine-tuning and continual interpretation that common law statutes 
and dynamic areas of the law require. Even when Congress intends to 
make small changes, larger effects result. It is difficult for Congress to 
surgically intervene and make small tweaks to statutes because courts 
draw conclusions about what is not changed when Congress takes 
limited action. If Congress makes a minute amendment, courts then 
draw the negative inference that because Congress did not change 
another related provision, it has “acquiesced” to the previous 
interpretation of that provision and means to lock it in.152 The resulting 
 
 147. Antitrust is a similar area of federal common law, where the Sherman Act provides the 
statutory backbone and “offer[s] only broad, vague legal standards to the courts . . . [who] view[] 
these open-ended statutes as a legislative delegation to the judiciary.” Note, Antitrust Federalism, 
Preemption, and Judge-Made Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2557, 2569 (2020); see also Nard, supra 
note 143, at 53 (“[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a common law enabling statute, 
leaving ample room for courts to fill in the interstices or to create doctrine emanating solely from 
Article III’s province.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 148. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are 
“Common-Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89, 
93 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (footnote omitted). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) (“The long time failure 
of Congress to alter the [Sherman] Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment 
by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is 
persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one.”); Deborah 
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of 
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 546–51 (2009) (explaining how 
Congress’s neglecting to amend other discrimination-related statutes like the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it amended Title VII was 
interpreted by the Court as a signal that Congress intended the language in those other statutes 
to be governed by the prior, “overridden” judicial interpretation).  
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statute is then more “static” and less capable of evolution, as courts 
work to maintain its locked-in interpretation. 
Though a legislative override could be well-intentioned and might 
successfully allow for the patenting of diagnostic methods now, it risks 
keeping other parts of the patent statute in stasis, a result not conducive 
to dealing with developing technology and science in the future. 
Furthermore, it faces the same problem of being subject to subsequent 
judicial interpretations of statutory language, which, as the next 
Section demonstrates, may revert back to the old standard anyway. 
C. A Legislative Override Is Still Subject to Judicial Interpretation 
As the situation at the Federal Circuit has grown more dire, an 
increasing number of parties have called for either the Supreme Court 
or Congress to step in and address the mess that is § 101.153 Legislators 
have begun to take action, claiming that “[i]t’s time to restore 
America’s patent system” because current patent laws are “hostile to 
innovation.”154 Senators Coons and Tillis have released a draft bill155 
that seeks to overhaul the patent eligibility standards in § 101 and have 
held hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property soliciting feedback on the drafted language.156 
Representatives from industry, academia, trade groups, bar 
 
 153. Steven Lundberg, Dave Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 
14, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kappos-calls-abolition-section-101 [https://
perma.cc/FG72-RG8D] (detailing a former USPTO director’s call to eliminate § 101 entirely). 
Bart Eppenauer, a former chief patent counsel at Microsoft, notes,  
While I don’t believe it is yet time to take legislative action, recent calls for the abolition 
of Section 101 entirely and dissatisfaction with application of the Mayo/Alice test is 
reaching a critical level. [Sequenom] offer[s] a significant opportunity to establish 
much-needed clarifications. Should this opportunity be missed, it is hard to see how 
Congressional action can be avoided. 
Eppenauer, supra note 107; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 154. Coons & Tillis, supra note 42. 
 155. Tillis-Coons Press Release, supra note 44. 
 156. Videos and transcripts of testimony can be found on the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
website. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I, COMM. JUDICIARY (June 4, 2019, 2:30 
PM), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i 
[https://perma.cc/M9WJ-SSFD]; The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part II, COMM. 
JUDICIARY (June 5, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-
eligibility-in-america-part-ii [https://perma.cc/URG3-CUEE]; The State of Patent Eligibility in 
America: Part III, COMM. JUDICIARY (June 11, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-iii [https://perma.cc/4FQL-4F7V].  
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associations, former Federal Circuit judges, PTO officers, and other 
stakeholders testified.157 
The proposed bill is an example of what a legislative override of 
patent eligibility might look like. It adds a new definition of “useful” to 
§ 100, the definition section of the patent statute, and overhauls § 101: 
Section 100:  
(k) The term “useful” means any invention or discovery that provides 
specific and practical utility in any field of technology through human 
intervention. 
Section 101:  
(a) Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.158 
The bill completely abrogates the judicially created exceptions 
and two centuries of case law159 in order to create a “clear legal 
framework for what types of innovations are patent eligible.”160 
However, like any legislative override, the language of the new draft 
bill would still be left to courts to interpret. The “framework” may not 
be so clear to the judges who must interpret it, especially when it comes 
to applying it to new inventions in a variety of fields. And while the 
language of this specific bill may succeed in securing patents for 
diagnostics, eliminating the exceptions wholesale threatens to create a 
new, clear path to evergreening for pharmaceutical companies.161 
Instead of over-filtering, the new § 101 could under-filter, allowing for 
 
 157. For a detailed summary of the testimony, see Stuart P. Meyer, Still No Shortage of 
Viewpoints as Eligibility Debate Moves to the Hill, FENWICK: BILSKI BLOG (June 27, 2019), https:/
/www.bilskiblog.com/2019/06/still-no-shortage-of-viewpoints-as-eligibility-debate-moves-to-the-
hill [https://perma.cc/BKT3-BTVZ]. 
 158. Tillis-Coons Press Release, supra note 44. 
 159. See id. (“No implicit or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility, 
including ‘abstract ideas,’ ‘laws of nature,’ or ‘natural phenomena,’ shall be used to determine 
patent eligibility under section 101, and all cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions to 
eligibility are hereby abrogated.”). 
 160. Coons & Tillis, supra note 42. 
 161. See supra Part I.C.  
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an influx of questionable patents that may also threaten downstream 
innovation.162  
For example, under the language of the proposed new bill, an 
invention must provide utility in any field of technology. What counts 
as a field of technology? An artful patent prosecutor could easily 
search for ways to use the term “technology” to obtain patents on 
concepts not currently considered patentable. For example, it is well 
recognized that Einstein’s equation for mass-energy equivalence, 
E=mc2, is not patentable.163 Under the Tillis-Coons standard, could a 
method of using a calculator (a field of technology) that is programmed 
to take inputs from a human (human intervention) and apply them to 
the equation be patented? And would that then prevent others from 
using a calculator to compute applications of the equation in the 
future? Of course, this would almost certainly not pass other patent 
requirements, but it is not immediately clear that it would fail at the 
Tillis-Coons § 101 stage. This goes to show how any legislative solution 
will necessitate judicial interpretation and elaboration—what counts as 
a field of technology, and how rigorously should that distinction be 
applied? By abrogating the current § 101 wholesale, the courts will 
have to start from an entirely blank slate in attempting to corral a 
chaotic technological landscape. Broad language like that of the Tillis-
Coons bill would offer minimal guidance. 
Furthermore, in a phenomenon that Professor Deborah Widiss 
has termed “shadow precedent,” “the Supreme Court and lower courts 
often narrowly construe the significance of congressional overrides and 
instead rely on the prior judicial interpretation of statutes as expressed 
in overridden precedents.”164 Though Widiss focuses on the 
phenomenon as it applied to interpretations of Title VII and 
 
 162. E.g., Othman Laraki, Proposed Patent Legislation Would Block Research, Stifle 
Innovation, and Harm Patients, STAT (June 6, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/06/
proposed-patent-legislation-stifle-innovation-harm-patients [https://perma.cc/54P5-M8K7]; Alex 
Moss, The Tillis-Coons Patent Bill Will Be a Disaster for Innovation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/tillis-coons-patent-bill-will-be-disaster-
innovation [https://perma.cc/QHR2-TJWW]; Alex Moss, A Terrible Patent Bill Is On the Way, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/05/terrible-patent-
bill-way [https://perma.cc/99H8-WAMG]. 
 163. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (explaining that like “a new 
mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild,” such an equation is a 
“manifestation[] of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none” (quoting Funk 
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))). 
 164. Widiss, supra note 152, at 512.  
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discrimination law,165 this phenomenon has occurred in patent law as 
well, following the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(“AIA”)—major legislation that overhauled the U.S. patent system in 
2011.166 Despite the amendment and addition of new language to the 
patent statute, the Supreme Court held that a common law rule about 
secret sales that predated the AIA survived its enactment.167 In doing 
so, they dismissed a plain text reading that indicated that the new 
language should change the rule.168  
Here, future courts may rely on the “shadow precedent” of Mayo 
to construe newly enacted § 101 language in a similar manner to the 
previous iteration of § 101. Absent any new guidance on how to 
interpret the new § 101 statute, courts may fall back on using the old 
common law judicial exceptions, recreating them anew and bringing 
the inquiry back to square one: How should these judicially created 
exceptions be interpreted and applied? 
D. A Refined Two-Step Test Can Save Diagnostics and § 101 
Rather than waiting for congressional action and continuing to 
allow the Federal Circuit to muddle its way through Mayo, the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a patent subject matter 
eligibility case and clarify that the Mayo test need not be applied so 
rigorously. As Judge Linn suggested in his concurrence in Sequenom, 
the Court should limit Mayo to its facts and emphasize that the second 
step should not categorically dismiss a patent with any “conventional 
 
 165. Id. at 536–60.  
 166. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 167. Prior to the enactment of the AIA, an inventor’s secret commercial sale of an invention 
to a third party made the invention “prior art” such that it could no longer be patented. Helsinn 
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 633 (2019). The AIA changed the 
language of the governing provision slightly. Id. at 631–32. It now precludes a person from 
obtaining a patent on an invention that was “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018) 
(emphasis added). The words “on sale” had been in the statute before the AIA, but the phrase 
“or otherwise available to the public” was a new addition, with little to no legislative history to 
explain it. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the 
Court, held that the reenactment of the words “on sale” was enough to justify importing the prior 
secret sale rule from before the AIA was enacted, id. at 634, even though “otherwise available to 
the public” could be interpreted as limiting “on sale” to instances where an invention is on sale to 
the public, not just in secret.  
 168. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 634 (rejecting the argument that the added 
language constrained the meaning of “on sale”). 
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or obvious” activity, but it should rather look to see if that activity, in 
combination with all the other steps claimed in the process, still yields 
something new and useful that goes beyond a mere “abstract idea” or 
“law of nature.”169  
The Supreme Court itself, in a previous § 101 process patent 
case—which ostensibly still holds force—has emphasized that a 
patent’s claims must be “considered as a whole” because a combination 
of steps might still be patentable even if its individual constituents were 
already known and used before being combined.170 In applying that 
language to the patent in Mayo, the Court did not find the combination 
sufficient for patentability since “the combination amounts to nothing 
significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable 
laws when treating their patients.”171 Though that may have been 
appropriate for that specific patent, lower courts have read the case to 
mean that any similar diagnostic with “conventional” steps should be 
ineligible for a patent.172 This is a case of bad facts creating bad law, 
and it is time the Court step in and clarify the standard—conventional 
activities at the second step do not warrant a per se invalidation, even 
in the diagnostic context; rather, the second step should be an holistic 
evaluation of the claims in context.  
This standard would filter out Mayo’s patent while still making 
Sequenom’s MaterniT21 method patent eligible. Though the steps of 
isolating and amplifying fetal DNA may be conventional, isolating and 
amplifying fetal DNA noninvasively, from a material that was 
previously considered disposable garbage is certainly innovative. The 
patent at issue in Athena would also be patent eligible. Though it is 
directed to a “law of nature”—the interaction between the biomarker 
antibody and the testing molecule the inventors use to detect it—and 
the subsequent steps of detecting and evaluating the biomarker are 
conventional in the field, using this system to detect this particular 
biomarker was groundbreaking.173 Furthermore, it enabled doctors to 
determine the cause of myasthenia gravis in the 20 percent of patients 
whose etiology had previously been unknown.174 
 
 169. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012); Ariosa 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring). 
 170. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
 171. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. 
 172. See supra Part II.A. 
 173. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 855 (2020) (mem.) (No. 19-430). 
 174. Id. at 5–6.  
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This flexible, holistic version of Mayo’s second step allows 
diagnostics to be patent eligible while still filtering out completely 
conventional and noninnovative patents at the § 101 stage. The Federal 
Circuit, with its greater subject matter expertise in patent law and 
emerging technologies, could further refine the test as more cases 
percolate through the system. This will provide guidance to the lower 
courts, examiners, and inventors, and it will assure the 
biopharmaceutical industry that patent protection is available for 
successful investments in research and development. Those worried 
that it sets too low a bar for eligibility can rest assured that other 
requirements of the patent statute, namely novelty and 
nonobviousness, can still play a filtering role. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The current state of § 101 cannot continue—it is unworkable for 
the lower courts, resulting in inconsistent applications that leave actors 
in the patent system in flux and unsure of how to evaluate new 
inventions. This is especially so in the biotechnology field, where many 
new developments rely on the “laws of nature” implicit in the 
functioning of the human body. By raising doubts about patents for 
these developments, the current Mayo test also raises doubts for those 
potential investors who might fund the research necessary to bring new 
diagnostics and precision medicines to patients. By reworking the 
Mayo test to more holistically evaluate diagnostic patents, the Supreme 
Court could effectively balance innovation and preemption concerns 
to ensure that meritorious diagnostics are patent eligible. A judicial 
refinement of the patent-eligibility test also acknowledges that because 
the inventions and technology that patents cover are ever evolving, 
judicial interpretations of the patent statute must be as well. A 
legislative override, while well-meaning, could lead to widespread and 
unintended effects in an area of the law that should remain federal 
common law. 
 
